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Summary 
Federal education policy will soon undergo a major revision, with significant consequences for the state’s 
own policy and practices. This report seeks to help federal and state policymakers consider this restructuring 
and one of its core questions: How should schools and school districts be held accountable for the academic 
progress of their students?  
At present, California schools and districts are held accountable based on rules set forth in the federal No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2002. NCLB requires schools and districts to show that increasing shares of 
their students are attaining specified levels of proficiency in English and math. These levels must be attained 
by NCLB-set deadlines until the final 2014 deadline, when all students in the state are to be proficient. 
Schools and districts can face sanctions if they fail to meet proficiency deadlines—up to and including being 
closed down and their students dispersed to other schools.  
However, it is now generally acknowledged in the education community that few California schools will 
actually meet the 2014 NCLB goal of 100 percent proficiency. Theoretically, that means a majority of 
California schools could be facing federal sanctions.     
In light of these realities and of the upcoming policy restructuring, policymakers may want to consider an 
alternative method for measuring student proficiency. A value-added model makes it possible to identify 
schools where students’ test scores are higher or lower, on average, than one would expect given their prior 
achievement histories and other background characteristics. A value-added model measures each school’s 
contribution to student learning rather than the share of students at each school who have attained set 
proficiency levels. (Value-added models can also be used to evaluate individual teachers, but that is not the 
object of this research.)  
A value-added model may provide a more accurate measure of how schools are actually doing. Here’s why: 
The current accountability system may be judging schools partly on factors that schools cannot control. Our 
analysis of schools that are least likely to meet NCLB’s 2014 goals finds that they tend to have more 
economically disadvantaged students and English learners. Conversely, those that consistently meet their 
yearly NCLB goals have fewer such students, as well as smaller overall enrollments.  
This finding suggests that the attainment of proficiency levels is not purely a measure of school quality,  
but also a measure of the type of students a school happens to serve, along with other salient school 
characteristics such as size. A value-added model, which would measure the school’s contribution to student 
learning, would diminish the impact the composition of a particular student body has on a school’s 
accountability rating. Using a value-added approach would therefore be a more accurate and fair means  
of assessing school effectiveness.  
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Introduction 
With the passage of NCLB in 2002, school accountability became the principal policy model by which the 
federal government tries to improve the academic outcomes of the nation’s K–12 students. This was a significant 
change from earlier policy efforts, which had focused on providing more money to stimulate improvements. 
Like many of the state accountability programs that preceded it—including California’s—NCLB sets annual 
student proficiency levels, and schools and school districts are required to make sure that increasing shares of 
their students meet those levels. It also requires schools and districts to report publicly which goals have and 
have not been met, and sanctions those that repeatedly fail to meet these goals.  
The primary tool for measuring accountability now in use in California is standardized test performance in 
English language arts and in math. High-school graduation rates and scores on the Academic Performance 
Index (API) tests are also used. Each year, NCLB requires schools and school districts to meet the four 
performance goals shown in Table 1. Schools and school districts that do so are designated as having made 
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP). Missing one of these four targets, however, means schools and districts have 
failed to demonstrate AYP, and if they fail two years in a row, sanctions can follow.1 A school or district reverts 
back to normal status after it makes AYP two years in a row.2  
TABLE 1  
Adequate Yearly Progress requirements 
Requirement Description 
Annual Measurable 
Objectives (AMO), English 
language arts 
The share of students who achieve the level of proficient or above must meet or 
exceed that year's target, and 95 percent of students must be tested. These 
requirements must be met both overall and within each numerically significant 
subgroup.3 
Annual Measurable 
Objectives, math 
The share of students who achieve the level of proficient or above must meet or 
exceed that year's target, and 95 percent of students must be tested. These 
requirements must be met both overall and within each numerically significant 
subgroup. 
Academic Performance 
Index (API) score 
The API score must either increase by one point or meet the annual API target. 
High school graduation 
rate 
The graduation rate must increase by 0.1 percentage points in one year, increase by 
0.2 percentage points in two years, or reach the annual graduation rate target. 
NOTE: The graduation rate requirement only applies to schools and districts serving high school students. Elementary and middle 
school grades use the California Standards Tests (CSTs) and high school grades use the grade 10 grade administration of the 
California High School Exit Exam (CAHSEE) to measure student proficiency.  
Unmistakably, English and math proficiency rates have been improving in California. Steady gains are clear not 
only for all students on average, but also within demographic subgroups. Figure 1 displays average proficiency 
rates from the California Standards Test (CST) in English and math across California students between 2003 
                                                          
 
1 Only schools and districts that receive federal funds under NCLB face sanctions. 
2 Schools or districts that fail to make AYP for two consecutive years are designated for Program Improvement (PI).  PI’s sanctions increase in 
severity each year, beginning with restrictions on the way a district can spend funds and concluding with “alternative governance” of schools  
and “corrective action” against districts. 
3 A subgroup is numerically significant in California if it represents at least 100 students at a school or district, or 50 students making up at least  
15 percent of the school’s or district’s enrollment. 
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and 2010. Student proficiency in English improved 19 percentage points over that period. This translates into 
growth in excess of 50 percent above the 2002 level. In most cases math trends mirror the English trends.  
FIGURE 1  
Math and English proficiency have risen steadily this decade 
 
 
 
Moreover, California has rigorous standards for proficiency. The Thomas B. Fordham Foundation reviewed 
state content standards in 2006 and gave California’s the highest marks; it was the only state to receive a grade 
of A in each of the five subject areas examined (Finn, Julian, and Petrilli 2006). A similar analysis by Peterson 
and Hess (2008) ranks California fifth. A report by the National Center for Education Statistics (Bandeira de 
Mello et al. 2009) does not rank California as high, but does find that California’s reading standards are among 
the most difficult and its math standards are above the median.  
Although these improvements have encompassed all subgroups, not all achieved at the same level: proficiency 
by white and Asian students exceeded the average, while economically disadvantaged students, English 
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learners, and students with disabilities had below-average rates of proficiency.4 Nonetheless, subgroup trends 
do show consistent patterns of growth—proficiency improved at least 16 percentage points in each subgroup 
over the seven-year period.  
It is not clear that these CST score improvements are a direct result of NCLB. Scores on the Stanford 9 achievement 
test, which is no longer in use, were rising before NCLB was instituted, and scores on the National Assessment 
of Educational Progress were rising before 2002 and continued to do so thereafter. The lack of any available 
control group—because NCLB applies to all students in the nation—is the chief obstacle to gauging NCLB’s 
effectiveness. 
Despite these improvements, it is unlikely that the majority of California schools will meet the NCLB target of 
100 percent student proficiency by the 2014 deadline. Thus, policymakers could conceivably be faced with a 
situation in which sanctions are triggered and imposed against a majority of California schools, even though 
proficiency rates have increased significantly. 
  
                                                          
 
4 Students can belong to more than one subgroup. 
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Accountability and NCLB 
Now more than eight years old, NCLB was a reauthorization of the federal Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA) of 1965—which is now due for another reauthorization by Congress. Much debate about 
what the new legislation might or should look like has already occurred. It is clear that the accountability model 
based on standardized tests will continue, as will performance targets for schools and student subgroups. A 
fundamental question is how to most fairly assess the effectiveness of a school. 
As policymakers undertake ESEA renewal, they may wish to consider ways to refine accountability in order to 
encompass factors such as the rising CST scores noted above. One concern is that schools that succeed in 
meeting NCLB requirements do so not because they are more effective schools, but because of the students they 
inherit. There are clear differences between the composition of schools and districts that do meet their Annual 
Measurable Objectives (AMO) and those that do not. In our analysis (Table 2), the former have smaller total 
enrollments, higher math and English proficiency rates, and lower percentages of economically disadvantaged 
and English learner students. They also have slightly fewer subgroups that are subject to NCLB requirements.5   
Conversely, schools that fail to meet their AMOs generally have larger enrollments overall and more 
economically disadvantaged students. This suggests that the current system evaluates schools and districts at 
least in part based on the student population in the geographic region they serve. That is, the current school 
accountability system may be judging schools in part on factors that schools cannot actually do anything about.   
Moreover, our projections6 of California school AMO attainment levels out to the 2014 deadline indicate that the 
discrepancies between these two groups are unlikely to diminish (Table 3). This is true whether proficiency 
growth continues at the same rate or slows down, as might be expected in the later stages of NCLB, when 
student proficiency rate requirements begin to approach 100 percent. (Comparable projections for school 
districts can be found in the Technical Appendices.)  
  
                                                          
 
5 Novak and Fuller (2003) find that schools in California were more likely to make AYP if they had fewer subgroups because they are responsible for 
meeting fewer AMOs.   
6 Descriptions of the data and methodology we use to project proficiency rates are described in the Technical Appendices. 
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TABLE 2  
Characteristics of schools and districts that met their AMOs in 2009 
 Schools Districts 
2009 Averages Made AMOs 
Did not make 
AMOs Made AMOs 
Did not make 
AMOs 
Proficiency (%)     
English language arts 63.6 43.3 65.9 49.4 
Mathematics 68.4 47.2 65.8 51.3 
Subgroup populations (%)   
African American 6.0 8.5 2.3 4.9 
American Indian 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.1 
Asian American 11.1 6.0 6.1 5.8 
Filipino 2.9 2.7 1.5 2.2 
Latino 38.3 60.2 27.0 49.7 
Pacific Islander 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.6 
White 38.9 19.9 59.1 33.5 
Economically disadvantaged 44.7 70.4 35.7 59.2 
English learners 26.8 42.5 16.8 34.0 
Students with disabilities 11.3 11.6 10.9 10.8 
Other school and district data   
Valid subgroups 5 4 7 7 
Tested students 425 556 2103 5908 
Number of schools/districts 3,507 3,044 275 505 
NOTE: Students are tested in grades 2–8 and 10. Values for which we reject a t-test of the null hypothesis of zero difference 
between the two averages at p < 0.05 are in bold type. 
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TABLE 3  
Characteristics of schools by projected AMO passage in 2014 
  Constant growth Slowing growth 
2009 Averages 
Projected to make 
AMOs 
Not projected 
to make AMOs 
Projected to 
make AMOs 
Not projected 
to make AMOs 
Proficiency (%)    
English language arts 62.3 43.9 75.3 47.9 
Mathematics 67.8 47.0 78.7 52.6 
Subgroup populations (%)   
African American 6.0 8.5 4.6 7.9 
American Indian 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 
Asian American 10.7 6.4 16.0 6.6 
Filipino 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 
Latino 40.8 58.1 22.4 56.1 
Pacific Islander 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 
White 36.9 21.5 50.8 23.9 
Economically disadvantaged 47.7 67.9 26.3 65.6 
English learners 28.5 41.2 16.9 39.2 
Students with disabilities 11.3 11.6 11.1 11.5 
Other school characteristics   
Valid subgroups 5 4 4 5 
Tested students 409 581 354 525 
Number of schools 3,648 2,907 1,496 5,059 
NOTE: Values for which we reject a t-test of the null hypothesis of zero difference between the two averages at p < 0.05 are in 
bold type. 
  
 http://www.ppic.org/main/home.asp Improving School Accountability in California  12 
Accounting for Student Improvement 
The alternative accountability model we suggest7 is based on measuring student improvement and has become 
known in education circles as a value-added model. In its simplest form, a value-added model of school 
effectiveness estimates the relationship between a student’s score on a year-end test and three other factors: the 
school attended by the student, a baseline test taken at or before the beginning of the year, and typically a set of 
student background characteristics. Such a model makes it possible to identify schools where students’ test 
scores are higher, on average, than one would expect given their baseline scores, and schools where students 
score lower, on average, than one would expect given their baseline scores. 
Little research has been done on district-level value-added models, and it is not clear if it is possible to identify 
the direct effect of districts on student learning. One possibility for holding districts accountable is to evaluate 
them based on the value-added scores of schools in the district. We do not assess here the value-added-model as 
a basis for evaluating districts, nor do we assess the value-added model as a basis for evaluating individual 
teachers. The capability of value-added models to evaluate teachers has attracted much media attention, but it  
is not any part of our focus here. We examine only the potential of value-added as a school accountability 
measurement tool, and ultimately as a way to improve schools.   
Value-added models have the potential to improve student outcomes in California, but can only do so if the 
accountability system and the value-added model on which the accountability system is based are designed 
well. The validity of the inferences that can be drawn from a value-added model depends in part on the 
specification of the model, and the effectiveness of the accountability system depends on the specific details of 
its implementation. A number of states and districts, including Colorado, Louisiana, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Chicago, Dallas, and Washington, D.C., are in the process of developing or have 
already developed value-added models, although many of these areas plan to use value-added for program 
evaluation, rather than for accountability purposes. Before deciding on the specifics of California’s 
accountability system, policymakers should study and learn from the experience of states and districts that have 
implemented value-added models. Value-added models have served different purposes in different areas; when 
studying different areas’ implementation experiences, policymakers should keep in mind the goals behind these 
different value-added models. 
The Safe Harbor Alternative 
Policymakers may decide that switching to an accountability system based on value-added may be too 
complicated, and may search for a simpler alternative that still incorporates growth in student achievement. 
Over the past few years, increasing numbers of schools have been making AYP through a number of alternative 
methods, including one called Safe Harbor (Table 4). Safe Harbor is based on growth in proficiency rates, is far 
                                                          
 
7Education researchers have been using value-added models for at least four decades (e.g. Hanushek 1971), but research on value-added models has 
flourished in the past decade, and most of the research has focused on teacher-level value-added modeling.  A complete review of the literature on 
value-added models is outside the scope of this paper. Todd and Wolpin (2003) provide a formal overview of the model and the assumptions on 
which different specifications of the model are based. Harris (2009), Reardon and Raudenbush (2009), and McCaffrey et al. (2003) provide 
comprehensive overviews of the strengths and weaknesses of value-added models. The findings from these reviews indicate that there is measurable 
variation in teacher effectiveness, but that analysts developing these models should take care to ensure that their results are robust to several 
methodological challenges. For example, Rothstein (2010) provides evidence that non-random assignment of students into classrooms biases value-
added estimates for teachers, while Koedel and Betts (2011) suggest that this bias is mitigated if one includes in the estimation model students taught 
over several recent school years. 
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less complicated than a value-added model, and is already used in California. Under Safe Harbor, schools and 
districts can make AYP if the share of students who are proficient increases enough to meet a target, which is 
based on the proficiency rate at that school or district during the previous year. Although Safe Harbor is based 
on growth in proficiency, it is different from value-added models, which are based on the growth in 
achievement of individual students. Instead, Safe Harbor compares the proficiency rates of consecutive cohorts 
of students. 
TABLE 4  
Alternative methods for making Adequate Yearly Progress 
Requirement Description 
Safe Harbor  Schools and districts that met their API and Graduation requirements but did not make 
one of their AMOs can meet AYP if the share of students in the district, school, or 
subgroup performing below the proficient level in either ELA or math decreased by at 
least 10 percent from the preceding school year. 
Adjustment for students 
with disabilities  
Schools and districts that did not make AYP solely due to their students with disabilities 
subgroup not making AMOs were allowed to add 20 percentage points to their percent 
proficient in mathematics for this subgroup during the years 2005–2007 and 20 
percentage points for their percent proficient in ELA for this subgroup during the years 
2005–2006. 
Pass using a two-year 
average  
Schools, districts, or subgroups that do not meet an AMO can make AYP if the share of 
students who were proficient in that AMO over the past two years meets the AMO target 
for the current year. 
Pass using a three-year 
average  
Schools, districts, or subgroups that do not meet an AMO can make AYP if the share of 
students who were proficient in that AMO over the past three years meets the AMO target 
for the current year. 
 
Figure 2 shows the rising rates of schools’ reliance on Safe Harbor in recent years in relation to the falling rates 
of using standard criteria to meet AMO. (The comparable figure for school districts can be found in the 
Technical Appendices.) Before 2005, few schools or districts relied on alternative methods to meet their AMOs.8 
Safe Harbor usage began to rise in 2005, the year in which the proficiency target climbed by 11 percentage 
points. Usage then diminished through 2007 as the proficiency target remained at its new (higher) plateau. 
When the proficiency targets increased again, so did reliance on Safe Harbor. 
                                                          
 
8 The main exception was district use of a temporary adjustment for the students with disabilities subgroup. From 2005 to 2007, schools and districts 
that only missed their AMOs for the students with disabilities subgroup could add 20 percentage points to their proficiency rate for that subgroup. In June 
2005 the United States Department of Education allowed the California Department of Education (CDE) to grant this exception temporarily while the 
CDE developed an alternative assessment designed to measure the achievement of students with moderate cognitive disabilities. The exception 
expired once the California Modified Assessment (CMA) was developed. This additional flexibility boosted passage rates for districts by over 10 
percentage points in 2005 and 2006, indicating that the students with disabilities subgroup jeopardized AMO passage for a sizable number of districts. The 
adjustment for students with disabilities had a smaller effect on AMO passage for schools because fewer schools have numerically significant subgroups 
of students with disabilities. This adjustment factor applied only to math in 2007, which practically eliminated its effect on passage rates because districts 
fell short in the English content area. The adjustment phased out entirely in 2008. 
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FIGURE 2  
Percentage of schools meeting Annual Measurable Objectives, 2002–2009 
 
 
Safe Harbor says that schools and districts are responsible for reducing their rate of non-proficiency by 10 percent 
annually. As proficiency rates grow, the percentage point gain in proficiency needed to meet Safe Harbor 
requirements shrinks. For example, a school or district needs to raise proficiency by 8 percentage points if it has  
20 percent of its students proficient, but only 4 percentage points once it has 60 percent proficient (Table 5).  
TABLE 5  
Safe Harbor requirements for high- and low- proficiency schools 
 High-proficiency school Low-proficiency school 
Percent proficient  60 20 
Percent not proficient  40 80 
10% of share not proficient  4 8 
Proficiency target  64 28 
 
We project9 that under NCLB, reliance on the Safe Harbor alternative is likely to increase until 2014. Our 
projections show that between one tenth and one third of school districts are likely to make their AMOs in 2014, 
and all of them will rely on Safe Harbor to do so. Similarly, 23 percent to 56 percent of schools are likely to make 
their AMOs in 2014 once alternative methods—and Safe Harbor in particular—are considered. That there will 
be greater use of Safe Harbor is not surprising because the proficiency gains needed to meet Safe Harbor 
requirements are now always less than those that are needed under the standard method. The share of schools 
and districts that rely on Safe Harbor to meet their AMOs is likely to increase every year after 2010 (Figure 3). 
                                                          
 
9 Descriptions of the data and methodology we use to project proficiency rates are described in the Technical Appendices. 
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FIGURE 3  
Actual and projected rates of schools meeting their AMOs  
(assuming constant growth) 
 
 
NOTE: Comparable figures for schools’ slowing-growth scenario and for school district constant- and slowing- growth scenarios 
can be found in the Technical Appendices. 
An accountability system that incorporated Safe Harbor would not solve the basic accountability problem, 
because it would still evaluate schools and districts based on factors outside their control. This finding derives 
from Safe Harbor rules that, as mentioned above, hold lower-performing schools and districts responsible for 
bigger gains in student proficiency. 
Value-Added Models and Implementation Issues  
A number of choices and decisions would face policymakers in any move to a value-added model. The 
experience of other states that have already developed a value-added model could certainly inform the 
decision-making process. Key questions that policymakers would need to consider in an accountability system 
based on value-added include the following:   
 Should a student’s baseline score be derived from a test taken at the beginning of the school year  
or from a test the student took in the previous year and grade? 
 Other than student baseline scores, which student or other characteristics should be controlled for  
in a value-added model? 
 How will schools and districts be held accountable for improving dropout rates? 
 How should rewards and sanctions be determined? 
The choice of baseline test used in the value-added model can affect the value-added model’s validity. Two 
candidates for the baseline test are a test the student took in the previous year and grade and a test taken at the 
beginning of the current year. The benefit of using the student’s score on test taken during the previous year as 
the baseline is that it requires students to be tested only once a year, reducing the amount of time diverted from 
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teaching and learning and toward testing. Another argument against using the student’s score on a beginning-
of-the-year test as the baseline is that it may present an opportunity for some schools to bend the rules, perhaps 
by discouraging students from doing their best on the test, or in some way creating an environment that results 
in artificially low baseline scores. This potential for abuse would tend to argue for the alternative of using the 
student’s score on a test taken in the previous year as the baseline. 
However, students experience considerable learning loss over summer vacation: on average, a student tested at 
the beginning of the summer and the end of the summer will perform worse on the end-of-summer test.10 If 
students who experience greater learning loss over the summer are not distributed evenly across schools, some 
schools will have to work harder to help students relearn what they lost over the summer. As a result, using 
scores from a test taken the previous year as a baseline may be unfair to schools where students experience a 
relatively high degree of summer learning loss.   
Students differ in ways other than their baseline test scores, and it is possible to control for these differences in  
a value-added model. A value-added model’s validity can be improved by including controls for differences 
across students that are correlated with factors that influence the rate at which students learn but over which 
schools have little control. Policymakers will need to choose from a number of potential value-added models, 
including models that control for observable student characteristics such as ethnicity, English fluency, and 
special education status. Different value-added models may yield different school effectiveness ratings based on 
the factors that are controlled for. Policymakers and analysts will need to select a model specification that most 
effectively assesses the performance of schools, rather than simply reflecting the characteristics of the students 
that schools inherit. 
An accountability system based on value-added may unintentionally inflate the scores of schools where large 
shares of students drop out, because more students whose growth potential is believed to be low would not be 
included in the evaluation of those schools. To reduce these unintended consequences, the new accountability 
system should continue to hold schools and districts accountable for dropout rates. Unfortunately, a value-
added model cannot be used to hold schools accountable for dropout rates: there is no baseline test for dropping 
out. Statistical modeling can be used to estimate the association between the likelihood that a student drops out 
and a number of other factors, including the school the student attends, the student’s age and grade, the 
student’s eligibility for free- or reduced-price lunches, the student’s ethnicity, and other factors. Estimates that 
control for student characteristics are a better measure of a school’s effectiveness at reducing dropout rates than 
the unadjusted dropout rates on which NCLB’s sanctions are based. 
NCLB holds schools and districts accountable for reaching specific proficiency rate and graduation rate targets, 
and in theory all schools could meet those targets. In contrast, a value-added model compares a school’s 
performance with the performance of other schools. Thus, a value-added model is best used to identify the most 
and least effective schools. Policymakers may choose to reward or sanction a set share of schools; for example, 
policymakers may choose to reward the top 10 percent of schools and sanction the bottom 10 percent, or those 
schools that are persistently near the top or bottom of the distribution.  
Finally, although the accountability system can be based on just one year of value-added data, rewards and 
sanctions could instead be based on two or three years of value-added data, as a system based on two or three 
years of data provides a more valid and reliable estimate of school effectiveness. 
                                                          
 
10 See Cooper et al. (1996) for a review of research on summer learning loss. 
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Conclusion 
Policymakers will soon consider how to renew and restructure both state and federal education policy. Some 
examination of ways that NCLB could be improved would not be out of order as part of this process. It is clear 
that since NCLB’s 2002 implementation, California student performance on math and English achievement tests 
has been rising. Yet it is generally acknowledged that a majority of California schools will not meet the NCLB 
2014 deadline for 100 percent proficiency. As a result, a majority of California schools that have seen rising 
achievement test scores would face sanctions.  
Schools where student learning occurs at a fast pace should be recognized and emulated. At the same time, the 
state should sanction and intervene at schools where student learning occurs at a slow pace. To improve state 
and federal accountability programs, policymakers should do the following:   
 Use a value-added model to evaluate school effectiveness.   
 Increase the state’s efforts to ready the California Longitudinal Pupil Achievement Data System 
(CALPADS).   
 Postpone sanctions until a value-added system is implemented.    
Below, we discuss each of these recommendations.  
Use Value-Added Models to Evaluate  
School Effectiveness 
Federal policymakers should reauthorize ESEA as an accountability system that uses a value-added model to 
measure school effectiveness. Because value-added models control for students’ initial levels of achievement, 
measures of school effectiveness obtained from value-added models are likely to be more accurate than 
California’s current measures of school effectiveness, which do not control for students’ initial levels of 
achievement. An accountability system based on value-added has the potential to identify the most and least 
effective schools more effectively than the current system does. By doing a better job of identifying exemplary 
schools and schools where changes are needed, an accountability system based on a value-added model has the 
potential to improve student outcomes in California.   
Although an accountability system based on value-added would be an improvement over the current system, 
which is based on levels of proficiency and comparisons of different cohorts of students, even the best value-
added model is not perfect. The validity of the model depends on how it is specified. Although we would like to 
have a highly accurate measure of a school’s effectiveness at improving math and English proficiency, value-
added can provide only one measure of effectiveness in these areas. And it should not be forgotten that schools 
and districts do much more than teach math and English. Any judgment of a school’s success or failure should 
be based on unusually high or low proficiency growth over a number of years, and policymakers should 
include other performance measures as well. 
Increase the State’s Effort to Ready CALPADS 
The goal of CALPADS is to merge student-level data that had previously been stored in separate data systems 
into a single, centralized database, and to make it possible to track an individual student across all of the years 
the student is enrolled in California schools. CALPADS has the potential to play an important role in an 
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accountability system based on value-added. Schools should be held accountable for the achievement growth 
for all students, regardless of whether the student attended the same district or a different district during the 
previous year. If the value-added model’s pre-test scores are obtained from a test taken at the beginning of each 
school year, districts do not need to share student test-score information with one another. But if the value-
added model’s pre-test scores or obtained from the previous year’s post-test, districts must identify the district 
from which each new student has transferred and request student test-score information from those districts.  
A centralized longitudinal student-level data system such as CALPADS can decrease districts’ costs associated 
with sharing data and may be essential to estimating value-added measures of school effectiveness in districts 
where transfer rates are high.   
There are other significant benefits of a longitudinal data system such as CALPADS. A statewide longitudinal 
student-level data system can be essential to holding schools and districts accountable for dropout rates, 
because it can make it much easier to determine whether a student who has left a district has re-enrolled at 
another. A statewide longitudinal data system will increase the likelihood that value-added will be used for 
purposes other than estimating school effectiveness. Value-added is an important tool for evaluating school 
policies and interventions, which can direct educators and policies toward successful programs and away from 
those found to be ineffective. 
The development CALPADS is behind schedule. Given the potential of a longitudinal data system to improve 
school accountability and program evaluation, it is important that the state not only continue to focus on, but 
also increase, its efforts to make ready a statewide longitudinal student-level data system.   
Postpone Sanctions  
This report presents evidence that under NCLB, schools and districts are evaluated in part on the basis of the 
students they inherit, rather than on their effectiveness. But schools with low levels of achievement are not 
necessarily schools with ineffective teachers and administrators. In fact, the rate of student learning at some of 
these schools may be relatively high, but because students enter school with very low ability levels, the success 
of these teachers and administrators goes unnoticed. Or the teachers and administrators at these schools may 
simply be ineffective. Until California evaluates schools on the basis of individual student achievement gains,  
it will not be possible to distinguish between schools where teachers and administrators are effective and where 
teachers and administrators are not. When ESEA is renewed, the sanctions it requires should be based on the 
gains in achievement made by individual students at a school, not by levels of student achievement at a school. 
Some may argue that schools with low levels of student achievement should be sanctioned regardless, because 
“anything is better” than the current school. This argument overlooks the possibility that some—perhaps 
many—of the schools with the lowest levels of achievement may prove themselves to be very effective schools 
once a valid measure of school effectiveness is put in place.  
At the same time, most research that has focused on the effects of sanctions has found no significant positive 
effects. Most studies of charter schools (e.g. Buddin and Zimmer 2005, Edwards et al. 2008) find that they are no 
more effective on average than non-charters; closing schools with low levels of student achievement does not 
typically lead to improved outcomes for the students who transfer from the closed schools (de la Torre and 
Gwnne 2009); the effects of additional teacher training are limited (Jacob and Lefgren 2004); extending the 
school year appears to have few positive effects (Card and Krueger 1992, Pischke 2007), nor does allowing an 
outside entity, including the state, to take over the school (Gill et al. 2007). At some schools, the effect of 
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sanctions may be to disrupt an effective school in order to implement expensive changes for which there is little 
track record of success.  
The ultimate goal of accountability programs is to improve student achievement. Certainly one positive outcome of 
accountability programs thus far is that they have forced states and schools to adopt content standards and 
measure student performance relative to those standards. However, accountability programs have not used the 
right metrics to identify successful and failing schools. Moving to a value-added model is a step in the right 
direction and would be a more accurate way to measure school performance. Ultimately, however, we must 
find better strategies for intervening in schools where the rate of student learning is too slow. 
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